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WILL&--TORTS

RECENT DECISIONS

TO

EXPECTANCIES-WRONGFUL

DESTRUCTION

OF

WILL&--In a tort action to recover damages for the destruction of a will,
plaintiff alleged that plaintiff's grandmother had executed a holographic will ·
prior to her death in October, 1939 by which she devised a farm to her two
children for their lives, and at their death to plaintiff in fee; that the defendants,
one of the two children and his wife, destroyed the will shortly before plaintiff's
grandmother's death and while she was non compos mentis. The petition alleged that if the will had not been destroyed it would have been duly probated,
but there was no allegation that this will was offered for probate, nor that it
could not be probated. The ten year statutory period of limitation for the probate of a will had not expired. Held, the petition does not allege facts sufficient
to constitute a tort cause of action, for a writing which has been duly executed
as a will, and never revoked, becomes effectual as such on the death of the
testator, and may be probated even though it has been lost ·or destroyed. Since
no facts have been alleged from which it can be inferred that the will cannot be
probated, a tort action cannot be maintained. Allen "· Lovell's .ddmx., (Ky.
1946) 197 S.W. (2d) 424.
In a recent article on this subject, Dean Evans suggests four possible remedies available to the injured party: (a) to resist in the probate court the probate
of a conflicting will and to admit proof of the suppressed will by such evidence as
may be available; (b) to sue in tort; ( c) to ask that a trust be raised; ( d) to
bring a bill in equity to set up the spoliated will. 1 After a careful review of most
of the important cases in this field, the court in the principal case established
Dean Evans' conclusion as a rule: "if a destroyed [or suppressed] will can be
probated, it should be; but if not, a tort action may be maintained.m This decision does much to round out a field of law left uncertain by the infrequency of
decisions. Two possibilities present themselves: the first is that plaintiff's petition
for probate of the will may be allowed, and his legacy recovered, despite defendant's wrongful act. As pointed out in Creek "· Laski, "the damage to
plaintiff from defendant's tort arose out of her being deprived of the legacy
because the destruction of the will rendered proof of the legacy impossible. If
she still could have proved it in probate court, she would have received no injury
from the tort in respect of the amount of the legacy. The best evidence of her
inability to prove the legacy would come from bona fide but unsuccessful attempt
to establish it in probate court. The attempt would also be a fulfillment of her
duty to minimize damages from the tort." 8 It will be noted that this declaration
by the Michigan Supreme Court seems to imply also that plaintiff may have
1 Evans, "Torts to Expectancies in Decedents' Estates," 93 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 187
at 196 (1944). Other possible remedies are (e) ejectment, Allen v. Grant, (N.Y.
S. Ct. 1918) 171 N.Y.S. 769; (f) partition proceeding, Harris v. Harris1 26 N.Y.
433 (186':3); (g) bill in equity for discovery and accounting, Gaines v. Chew, 2 How.
(43 U.S.) 619 (1844). No case has been discovered in which an equitable lien was
sought, but for reasons for preferring this remedy to the more common constructive
trust see 23 VA. L. REv. 420 at 422 (1937).
2 Principal case at 426.
8 248 Mich. 425 at 431, 227 N.W. 817 (1929), 65 A.L.R. II 13 at II19
(1930), 30 CoL. L. REv. 409 (1930), 14 MINN. L. RBV. 704 (1930).
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suffered damage from the increased difficulty of proof caused by the defendant's
wrongful act, not recompensed. by mere recovery of the legacy itself. It has been
held that these damages are also.recoverable in a separate action.4 The second
possibility is that plaintiff's petition for probate of the will may be disallowed, at
least in so far as plaintiff's particular legacy is concerned:' Where petitioner has
failed to produce the two witnesses required by a statute 8 held applicable to probate proceedings alone,7 it has been· decided that a judgment denying probate of
a suppressed will is not res judicata of plaintiff's right to maintain tort at law
on the same cause of action. 8 The principle of these cases, that lack of evidence
sufficient to satisfy probate should not bar other remedies where the evidentiary
requirements are not so strict, would seem to be equally applicable where the
requirements at probate are more strict than elsewhere despite the lack of a similar statute. The court in the principal case pointed out that Kentucky, though
it has no such statute, imposes strict requirements for the proof of lost wills/'
and referred to the fact that there may be presumptions and lowered evidentiary
requirements available to plaintiff in an action against the spoliator alone which
are not available to the plaintiff in an action where the rights of other parties
intervene.10 The rule established by the court clearly contemplates that under
these circumstances petition for probate is to be considered merely a pre-requisite
to further remedies. The soundness of this solution must be admitted, for otherwise~ should probate fail for want of evidence sufficient to meet requirements
more strict than at law or equity, defendant's wrong will have been made the
basis of a denial of plaintiff's r_ight. The court does not determine whether .or
not a prior decree of intestate distribution or the preceding probate of an inconsistent will is an excuse for failure to first petition for probate of the suppressed will.11 It does indicate that if the time for probate has elapsed, which is
an:alogous to the situation where a probate decree has become final, an attempt to
probate will not be required.12 It would seem that these principles are equally
applicable whether plaintiff seeks his remedy by means of a tort action or in attempting to impose a constructive trust on the profits gained by a wrongdoer.18
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v. Bennett, I Ohio C.C. 95, 1 Ohio C.D. 57 (1885).
If this failure is due not to defendant's wrongful act, but to other circumstances,
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failure of probate is a bar to other remedies. Allen v. Grant, (N.Y. S. Ct. 1918) 171
N.Y.S. 769.
.
6 See SIM.ES AND BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAw: MODEL PROBATE CoDE 298
( I 946) for a resume of statutes applicable to proof of lost wills.
7 Cf., McDaniel v. Pattison, 98 Cal. 86, 27 P. 651, 32 P. 805 (1893).
8 Creekv.Laski, 248 Mich.425, 227N.W. 817, 65 A.L.R. 1113 at 1119 (1929);
Harris v. Harris, 26 N.Y. 433 (1863); Willard v. Shekel!, 236,Mich. 197, 210 N.W.
260 (1926).
9 Principal case at 425. In general, see 126 A.L.R. u39. (1940).
10 Principal case at 426. See Anderson v. Irwin, IOI Ill. 4II {1882).
11 Cf.: Seeds v. Seeds, n6 Ohio St. 144, 156 N.E. 193 (1927); Morton v.
Petitt, 124 Ohio St. 241, 177 N.E. 591 (1931), 30 M1cH. L. REv. 478 (1932);
Estate of Walker, 160 Cal. 547, 117 P. 510 (1911). See also 95 A.L.R. 1107 at
1108 (1935). .
12 Principal case at 426.
18 But Cf.: Morton v. Petitt, 124 Ohio St. 241, 177 N.E. 591 (1931), 30
MrcH. L. REv. 478 (1932), with Petitt v. Morton, 28 Ohio App. 227, 162 N.E. 627
(19z8), 14 CoRN. L. Q. 108 (1928), _27 M1cH. L. REv. 452 (1929).

